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ABSTRACT
Social scientists agree that public confidence in social institutions is a crucial element in
building democratic society. This is especially true for transitional societies including postcommunist countries, because the lack of public confidence in newly emerged democratic
institutions can interfere with democratic development. Although different theories explaining
public confidence in social institutions were developed, these theories ignored the role that
mass media play in building public confidence. The goal of this study is to examine the
connection between mass media coverage of social institutions and public confidence in these
institutions by conducting content analysis of Belarusian newspapers, reviewing the results of
the public opinion polls from Belarus, and exploring the links between coverage of social
institutions and trust in them. Four institutions were chosen for this examination: two
institutions with high level of confidence representing the state (the President, the military) and
two institutions with low level of confidence representing civil society (independent labor
unions, opposition political parties).
Results showed that there is a noticeable connection between media coverage and public
confidence in social institutions. Content analysis demonstrated that the state-run newspapers
publish a great number of articles about Belarus President Lukashenko, covering him within the
scope of explicitly positive themes. As results of public opinion polls demonstrate, the
President enjoys an high level of confidence amongst people who trust state-run Media. On the
other hand, independent newspapers present President Lukashenko in a negative different light:
he is being depicted as a dictator and an ineffective leader. According to public opinion polls,
people who trust the independent media are less confident in the President: more than 42% do
have confidence in him. Given that state-run newspapers present the President almost
exclusively within positive themes and independent newspapers seldom speak of the
President’s achievements, concentrating mostly on his failures and shortcomings, we can see a
strong connection between media coverage of the President and levels of public confidence in
him. Examining media coverage and public opinion about other social institutions provided
similar results, confirming the connection between media coverage and public confidence in
this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Social science scholars agree that social trust is an essential component for the correct
functioning of democratic political institutions (see Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993,
1995, Sztompka, 1999) and of market economies (see Raiser, 1998). According to Sapsford
and Abbott (2006), the phenomenon of social trust consists of several related components:
confidence in social institutions and the social environment, trust in people and trust in the
existing socio-economic order.
Unfortunately, the literature shows no consistency in the use of terms “trust” and
“confidence.” In some works, the word “trust” has very broad meaning, while the word
“confidence” is used for trust only in social institutions, whereas in other works the words
“trust” and “confidence” are used interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, the term
“social trust” was used as a broader term, meaning the public’s expectation about the profitable
behavior of a social agent (Falcone & Castelfranchi, 2001), while “confidence” was used when
referring to public’s trust for social institutions.
As my review of the literature demonstrates, the problems of trust in society and
confidence in social institutions have been studied by scholars since the late 1960s. Moreover,
the problem of eroding confidence in institutions in transitional societies (including postcommunist countries) has been the focus of research in different disciplines for more than 20
years. The role that the mass media are playing in building public confidence in social
institutions is, however, not thoroughly studied and is often ignored by sociologist and political
scientists.
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As Walter Lippmann noted in 1922 in his famous work, Public Opinion, “the world that
we have to deal with… is out of mind, out of sight, out of mind.” Nearly a century after
Lippmann penned these words, McCombs (2004) wrote that most knowledge and information
that people possess still comes from the mass media: “Today we also have television and
expanding panoply of new communication technologies, but the central point is the same.”
American journalist Theodore White described the power of the mass media over public
opinion in 1972 as “an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and
mandarins (White, 1973).” Once again, McCombs (2004) commented, “In the years since
White’s cogent observations, social scientists across the world have elaborated the ability of the
mass media to influence many aspects of our political, social and cultural agendas.”
Thus, it would be a major mistake to ignore the role of the mass media in building
public confidence in social institutions. This thesis was conceptualized to make a small
contribution toward filling the gap in existing knowledge on the topic by studying the
connection between confidence in institutions and the media coverage of these institutions in
Belarus. The theoretical background of this study is based on works by distinguished Polish
sociologist Piotr Sztompka (1996, 1999, 2002, 2004) on issues of confidence in social
institutions in transitional societies, as well as his theories on the origins of public confidence.
Belarus was chosen for this study for several reasons: it is a transitional post-communist
society with a short recent history of having modern social institutions; it is an example of a
post-Soviet authoritarian regime with state control over mass media; and, due to its unique
geopolitical position, it is of special interest to the United States (see: Belarus Democracy Act
in chapter 3).
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Purpose of the Study
As the literature review demonstrates, the issue of public confidence in institutions is a
crucial element in building democratic society. Scholars note that confidence in institutions is
especially important in transitional societies, and the lack of public confidence in newly
emerged democratic institutions hinders their effectiveness and interferes with democratic
development. Although several theories try to explain the origins of public confidence, the role
of mass media is generally overlooked.
Taking into consideration that public confidence in social institutions is essential for the
effective functioning of a society, and considering that mass media influence public opinion,
the purpose of this thesis was to study ways in which selected social institutions are covered
by Belarusian media and to determine if there is a connection between media coverage
and levels of public confidence in these institutions.
A content analysis of selected Belarusian newspapers was conducted by the author, and
the results of the public opinion polls from Belarus, conducted by the Independent Institute for
Socio-Economic and Political Studies 1, were examined.

1

Independent Institute of Socio-Economic & Political Studies (IISEPS) is the first independent think
tank in post-Communist Belarus that was established in February 1992 by group of academics,
journalists, politicians and businessmen. Now IISEPS is registered as public institution in the Lithuanian
Republic.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORY BACKGROUND

The Problem of Trust
In the last two decades, the problem of trust has come to the fore of social science’s
attention (Sztompka stated, 1999). Collective intellectual effort led to the conclusion that “the
clear and simple fact that, without trust, everyday social life which we take for granted is
simply not possible” (Seligman, 1997). In addition, “trust becomes a more urgent and central
concern in today’s contingent, uncertain global conditions” (Misztal, 1996).
So what is trust and why does it matter? According to Sztompka (1999), the notion of
trust is related to the uncertainty and unpredictability of the future, which is of human
provenance: “Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others”. Gambetta (1988)
provided a similar perspective: “Trust is particularly relevant in conditions of ignorance and
uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of others”. Another useful
definition is given by Earle and Cvetkovich (1995): “[Trust is] a simplifying strategy that
enables individuals to adopt to complex social environment, and thereby benefit from
increasing opportunities”.
Two types of trust could be distinguished according to the objects of trust: interpersonal
and social. While interpersonal trust is dealing with other people, social trust has a more
abstract orientation toward different social objects, including social groups, social roles, social
institutions and organizations, social system and order, etc.
One of the basic reasons why trust is essential for society is its complex relationship
with cooperation: on one hand, trust is a necessary precondition for cooperation and on the
other, trust is a product of successful cooperation. According to Dasgupta (1988), “trust is a
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lubricant for cooperation.” And Gambetta (1988) affirms that distrust destroys cooperation,
writing, “If distrust is complete, cooperation will fail among free agents.”
Sztomka (1999) identifies two types of functions related to trust: personal and social
functions (Sztompka, 1999). On the personal level, trusting other people evokes positive
actions towards others, and liberates and mobilizes human agency. That is, as Almond and
Verba stress (1965), “belief in the benignity of one’s fellow citizens is directly related to one’s
propensity to join with others in political activity.” On the other hand, distrust plays the
opposite role, i.e. the level of activism, mobilization and freedom is lowered.
As to the wider community, the following functions of trust are reported by Sztompka
(1999), it (1) inspires sociability and cooperation with others (thus increasing social capital);
(2) encourages tolerance, recognition of differences and acceptance of strangers, and (3)
reinforces feelings of identity and collective solidarity. The opposite of trust, destroys social
capital, and leads to isolation and decay of social networks and channels of communication.
Distrust also mobilized defensive attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice and xenophobia.
Sztompka (1999) suggests a brief overview of the six major social sciences concepts, in
which, according to the author, “Trust appears as a core component,” and that demonstrates the
importance and intensity of trust-related research:
●

Civic culture: the line of research, started by Almond & Verba (1965), switched the
focus from the legal and institutional facts to “soft” factors, including believes and
values.

●

Civil society: according to Alexander (1992), “[is] an arena of social solidarity that is
defined in universal terms. It is the ‘we’ness’ of a national community, the feeling of
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connectedness to one another… that allows there to emerge a single thread of identity
among otherwise disparate people.”
●

Cultural capital: according to Bourdieu (1979), the key to social hierarchy and social
organization is hidden at the cultural level. Cultural capital was defined as cultural
signals used for cultural and social exclusion.

●

Social capital: Putnam (1995) defined social capital as “features of social life –
networks, norms and trust – that enables participants to work together more effectively
to pursue shared objectives… and, in short, refers to social connections and the
attendant norms and trust.”

●

Post materialistic values: as stated by Inglehart (1990), ‘soft’ cultural concerns and
commitments play the key role in the new set of values that emerged in developed
societies during last decades.

●

Civilizational competence: the focus on post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe
led Sztompka (1993, 1999) to the concept of ‘Civilizational competence’, that includes
social trust as one of the key components.
Apart from the above-mentioned indirect approaches that address the notion of trust as

part of a broad cultural system, several important studies are fully focused on trust:
●

Luhmann (1979) linked trust to the growing complexity and uncertainty of
contemporary societies, and suggested that in comparison to the traditional societies,
trust plays an even more important role in ‘late modernity’.
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●

Gambetta (1988) and his co-authors analyzed trust in different settings, including in
closed and exclusive communities like the Italian Mafia.

●

Hardin (1991, 1996) extended a rational-choice framework to the analysis of trust and
distrust.

●

Fukuyama (1995) created a comprehensive framework of trust as a crucial ingredient
for economic success (he based his arguments on examples of Japan, China and other
South-East Asian countries).

●

Sztompka (1999) presented his own comprehensive theoretical account of trust “as a
fundamental component of human actions.” He offers models of the emergence and
decay of trust cultures, based on his long-term studies of the communist and postcommunist societies.

Confidence in Social Institutions
The problem of confidence in social institutions has been studied for more than five
decades, and according to Newton and Norris (1999) consists of several sub-areas of research.
Some scholars are more interested in the loss of confidence in the main institutions of
democratic government, such as the executive branch, the parliament, the courts, the police or
the military (see Orren 1997; Dalton 1999). Others pay more attention to public opinion about
private institutions, such as the church, mass media, trade unions and major corporations (see
Lipset and Schneider 1983; Manaev, 2001, 2006). Another area of research is concentrated on
trust among people as an indicator of social stability (see Putnam 1995; Dalton 1996).
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Scholars describe social institutions as the basic “pillars” of society. In the modern,
complex world the confidence in such institutions provides the base for social and political
stability (see Luhmann 1988; Dunn 1984; Giddens 1990; Seligman 1997). Despite the
differences in the object of analysis, scholars agree that the loss of confidence in social
institutions has a wide range of negative consequences that often extend beyond the political
life of society (Dogan 1994; Dalton 1996; Listhaug 1995, Putnam, 1995).
The increasing erosion of confidence in fundamental social institutions across the globe
has been the focus of academic research since the early 1970s. For example, a Trilateral
Commission on the Crisis of Democracy in 1975 (Crozier et al. 1975, 158-59) concluded,
“Dissatisfaction with, and lack of confidence in, the functioning of the institutions of
democratic government have thus now become widespread in Trilateral countries.” Since that
time, several studies have demonstrated increasing dissatisfaction in central social institutions
in advanced industrial democracies (see Miller 1974; Niemi et al. 1989; Dogan 1994; Dalton
1996, 1999; Nye 1997; Nye and Zelikow 1997; Norris 1999). One study demonstrates how
expectations of a mass public and its confidence in social institutions can have a direct effect on
the effectiveness of a democratic government (see Putnam, 1993, 2000).

Studying Public Confidence in Transitional Societies
Studies of public confidence and its dramatic decline in institutions in transitional
societies, specifically post-communist countries, are quite extensive and constitute a separate
area of research, because of the severity of the regime repressiveness (see Markovaґ, 1994a,
1994b; Mischler and Rose, 1997; Rose, 1994, 1995, 2003; Miller, White, and Heywood, 1998;
Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina, 2001; Levada, Shubkin, Kertman, Ivanova, Yadov,
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Shiraev, 2002; Abbott, 2002; Sztompka, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004; Aberg and Sandberg, 2003;
Abbott and Beck, 2003; Kochanowicz , 2004; Jeffries, 2004; Sapsford and Abbott, 2006;).
Polish scholar P. Sztompka (see 1996, 2002, 2004) asserts that after the collapse of the
old Soviet system many post-communist societies experienced “cultural trauma,” which
includes crises of trust and confidence in institutions. As a result, society is transformed into an
“atomized society” in which trust is confined to small local pockets of inter-personal
interaction. One of the greatest problems with such a transformation is the emergence of
corruption on every possible level. With the erosion of confidence in social institutions, people
prefer to solve problems using personal connections. In addition, as Sapsford and Abbott
(2006) emphasize, the erosion of confidence in institutions results in a decline of public trust in
the socio-economic order and as a consequence societies become unstable, and are liable to
experience social shocks and revolutions.

Theories of Trust and Confidence
Over the years, many scholars attempted to explain the phenomenon of trust and public
confidence and its decline in social institutions. Sztompka‘s (1999) three dimensions of trust –
relational, psychological, and cultural – lead to the search for bases of trust in three different
areas of inquiry. According to Newton and Norris (1999), the three major schools of thought on
how to define trust and confidence include social-physiological, social-cultural and institutional
explanations.
The social-physiological explanations (see Erikson, 1950; Rosenberg, 1956, 1957;
Easton, 1965; Gabriel, 1995) connect trust and confidence in institution to basic personality
traits. The social and cultural models (see Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1990, Coleman
1990; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Sztompka 1996; Newton 1997; Rose, et al. 1998) explain
10

trust and confidence as the product of socialization and social experiences. The institutional
performance model focuses on the efficiency of institutions as the key to understanding the
citizen’s evaluations of these institutions (see Hardin, 1996; Newton and Norris, 1999; Newton,
1999).
It is important to note that none of these theories mention mass media as influencing
genesis of trust and confidence in social institutions. Mass media scholars have, of course, been
focusing on the influences of media on public opinion and political processes, elements that
lead into notions of trust and confidence in social institutions.

Media Effects: Spiral of Silence
Scholars of the mass media have articulated a number of theories pertinent to the subject
of this theses, including the agenda setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), gate keeping
theory (Lewin, 1947; White, 1950), two-step flow theory (Lazarsfeld, 1944; Lazarsfeld& Katz,
1955), among others. In its analysis of the findings, this thesis, in part, employs the spiral of
silence theory, which is focused not only on the mechanism of media influence but also on the
social implications of this influence on public opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; 1977; 1993).
This theory focuses on the concept of group pressure and concentrates on the influence
of the media on public opinion. The spiral of silence theory lies on an intersection between
communication, sociology and political science, and thus it is of special interest for this
researcher. The theory, introduced by German sociologist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, states
that people are more likely to express a certain opinion if they think that their point of view is
shared by the majority. Their exposure to and understanding of the majority opinion is
facilitated by the mass media, influencing their final decision on which view to support.
11

Thus, the "spiral of silence" refers to the way people tend to remain silent when they
feel that their views are in the minority. The theory is based on three premises: (1) people have
a "quasi-statistical organ," which allows them to sense the prevailing public opinion, even
without access to the results of public opinion polls, (2) people fear social isolation and know
what behavior will lead to it, and (3) people tend not to express their unpopular views, because
of their fear of isolation. If a person believes that his/her opinion is the one held by the
majority, he/she will more willingly express that opinion in public; if public opinion on the
matter changes, a person will be more willing to conceal an opinion that is no longer favored by
the public. The larger the perceived distance between popular opinion and personal opinion, the
less likely the person will express his/her unpopular point of view. The spiral of silence occurs
directly when people, whose opinion differs significantly from majority’s views, stay silent and
do not express their position publicly and especially via mass communication channels. Thus
an impression that there is only one dominant opinion in the society is created through mass
media and other communication tools.
Existing literature on the spiral of silence is quite extensive. Since Noelle-Neumann first
published her work in the early 1970’s, the spiral of silence theory has been studied and tested
repeatedly by scholars from different disciplines, including communication, sociology and
political science, including its effect on the democratic societies (Moy, Domke, &Stamm, 2001;
Detenber, Willnat, Aday, & Graf, 2004; Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005; Spencer &Croucher,
2008). Less attention has been paid, however, to the phenomenon in studies on countries with
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes (Manaev, Manayeva, Yuran, 2010) or in crosscultural studies (Lee, Detenber, Willnat, Aday, Graf, 2004; Kim, Han, Shanahan, Berdayes,
2004).
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The only study of the spiral of silence in post-communist or authoritarian society that is
available in English is the article, “Spiral of silence in election campaigns in post-communist
society” (Manaev, Manayeva, Yuran, 2010). This study examines the effects of the spiral of
silence in post-communist societies in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2001 and
2008 in Belarus. The authors of the study assumed that in an authoritarian society, where state
authorities use mass media as a tool of political control, particularly during important political
campaigns (elections, referenda, etc.), the “spiral of silence” becomes the intended result of
political communication and of control over public opinion. The socio-cultural peculiarities of
a post-communist society, as is the case in the Belarus-focused study, significantly strengthen
effectiveness of the phenomenon.
The results of the study outlined in the above-mentioned article, confirm its hypothesis
and demonstrate the existence of the effects of the spiral of silence in Belarus. The majority of
voters got their election campaign information from the mass media controlled by the state;
these media, above all other candidates, covered president Lukashenko during the presidential
campaign, and the candidates that supported him during Parliamentary campaigns. The results
of public opinion polls demonstrated that several months before the official election campaigns
(when voters were not sure about the majority opinion), people were more likely to cast their
votes for opposition candidates; whereas during the official campaigns (with strong proauthority propaganda dominating mass media coverage), people’s perceptions of how the
majority will vote dramatically changed as did their own electoral preferences. Coverage of the
official campaigns in state-run media “pumped” public expectations of “majority voting” in
favor of Lukashenko (in the presidential elections) and pro-Lukashenko candidates (in the
parliamentary elections).
13

The study described above demonstrates that institutional changes in post-communist
societies (including the introduction of free media and rule of law) alone are insufficient for
real democratic transformations without parallel social-cultural changes. It also identified the
need for further research on the issue in other post-communist countries in order to test the
assumption that due to cultural similarities (that derive from shared experiences of the Soviet
era) similar effects of the spiral of silence may be taking place across the region.
Ultimately, the spiral of silence theory suggests that mass media coverage has strong
effects on public opinion and thus it may be useful in explaining phenomena observed in this
thesis.
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CHAPTER III
BELARUS BACKGROUND AND MEDIA LANDSCAPE

Belarus: Façade Democracy and a Rogue Regime
Christopher Walker, Director of Studies at Freedom House, aptly outlined the
politically based divisions in Eastern Europe in 2009. At the time of this writing, more than
twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central and Eastern Europe and the former states
of the USSR are still split into two groups of countries: the new democracies and the still
authoritarian nations 2. Belarus, as well as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Russia, belong to the second category of repressive and undemocratic
countries. In fact, “Belarus is unique among the states of the former Soviet bloc, in that after
twelve years of ‘transition’, the country remains ‘stalled’ and backward-oriented… The country
balances between the prospect of democracy and a retreat to authoritarianism (Korosteleva,
Lawson & Marsh, 2003).”
Belarus declared independence in 1991, ending centuries of foreign control. After
several years of democratic transition, Alexander Lukashenko 3 was in 1994 elected through a
free and fair election as the country’s first post-Soviet president. Since his election, Belarus
rapidly evolved into “an example of a ‘façade regime’ in which democratic ‘scaffolding’
conceals a dictatorial style of polity building” (Korosteleva, Lawson & Marsh, 2003). As the
Freedom House’s report, Nations in Transit 2010, indicates, “Elected on a populist platform
and buoyed by widespread nostalgia for Soviet-era stability, President Lukashenka pursued a
reversal of nascent democratic openings of the early 1990... He restored Soviet-era symbols,

2

Walker, C. (2009). Fast-Forward, Rewind: Press Freedom since the Berlin Wall's Fall.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=72&release=1109
3
Several variations of the spelling of his name are used in different sources, including Lukashenko and
Lukashenka.
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reduced the Parliament and judiciary to rubber-stamp bodies, abandoned term limits for the
presidency, and took control over local administrations and security forces. President
Lukashenka also curbed media freedom, suppressed political opposition, and reasserted state
control over the economy 4.” Since the 1994 election, as Manaev (2009) writes, Lukashenko
invested himself with direct powers over most institutions; controlled the electoral process to
the extent that none of the presidential or parliamentary elections that were held in Belarus
since 1994 were recognized as free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe; marginalized political opposition; took complete control over state-run media and
nearly annihilated independent mass media, and created mechanism of control over the
economy.
In Freedom House’s annual report, Freedom in the World 2010 5, Belarus was labeled as
“Not Free” and was placed among “worst of the worst” in terms of political rights and civil
liberties. The combined rating average for the country is 6.5 (according to the rating, 1
represents most free and 7 the least free). As another Freedom House’s special report, Worst of
the Worst 2010: the world’s most repressive societies, 6 indicates: “Belarus is not an electoral
democracy. Serious and widespread irregularities have marred all recent elections. The
constitution vests most power in the president, giving him control over the government, courts,
and even the legislative process by stating that presidential decrees have a higher legal force
than the laws. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka systematically curtails press freedom…

4

Freedom House. (2011). Nations in Transit 2010.
http://freedomhouse.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=321:nations-in-transit2010&catid=46:nations-in-transit&Itemid=121
5
Freedom House. (2011). Freedom in the World 2010 Annual Report.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010
6
Freedom House. (2011). Worst of the Worst 2010: the World’s Most Repressive Societies.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/88.pdf

16

restricts freedom of assembly and of associations. The right to a fair trial is often not respected
in cases with political overtones.”
The U.S. Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report, 7states that the human rights
record of the Belarusian government remains very poor, the authorities committing frequent
abuses:
“The right of citizens to change their government was severely restricted. The
government failed to account for past politically motivated disappearances. Arbitrary
arrests, detentions, and imprisonment of citizens for political reasons, or for criticizing
officials, or for participating in demonstrations also continued. The judiciary lacked
independence, trial outcomes usually were predetermined, and many trials were
conducted behind closed doors. The government further restricted civil liberties,
including freedoms of press, speech, assembly, association, and religion and continued
to enforce politically motivated military conscriptions of opposition youth leaders. State
security

services

used

unreasonable

force

to

disperse

peaceful

protesters.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties were subjected to
harassment, fines, and prosecution.” 8
And according to the Heritage Foundation’s 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, Belarus
economic freedom score is 47.9, which ranks the country in 155th place among the free
economies in the world. As stated in the report 9, the low rating is a consequence of a high
corruption rate, an ineffective judiciary and a time-consuming bureaucracy, and strong

7

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. (2010). 2009 Human
Rights report. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136021.htm
8
Ibid.
9
Heritage Foundation. (2011). Index of Economic Freedom. http://www.heritage.org/Index/about
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government interference with the private sector (which influences monetary, investment and
financial freedoms).

The 2010 Presidential Elections and Post-Election Development
The Presidential election, that took place on December 19, 2010, failed to meet key
standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for democratic
elections. 10 As described in European Exchange/Human Rights Centre “Viasna”/Belarusian
Helsinki Committee’s Final Human Rights Defenders Monitoring Report on Presidential
Election in Belarus, 11 riot police brutally dispersed participants of mass demonstrations, people
who came to the main Minsk square to protest against the unfair conduct in the elections. More
than 700 people were arrested, including seven presidential candidates. Many protesters,
including presidential candidates and journalists, were brutally beaten by the police. Repression
against political opposition and independent mass media continued in the following months. 12
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Attacks on the Press 2010: Belarus report 13,
“In a massive post-election crackdown, authorities raided news outlets and detained at least 20
journalists covering protests over a flawed December 19 presidential vote... Leading journalists
such as Natalya Radina, editor of the pro-opposition news website Charter 97, and Irina
Khalip, correspondent for the Moscow newspaper Novaya Gazeta, were among those

10

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights. (2010). Belarus still has considerable way to go in meeting OSCE commitments, despite certain
improvements, election observers say. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/74656
11
European Exchange / Human Rights Centre “Viasna”/ Belarusian Helsinki Committee. (2011). Final
Human Rights Defenders Monitoring Report on Presidential Election in Belarus.
http://spring96.org/en/news/41257
12
Reporters Without Borders. (2011). Authorities seek to suppress news of plight of held journalists.
http://en.rsf.org/belarus-authorities-seek-to-suppress-news-24-01-2011,39386.html
13
Committee to Protect Journalists. (2011). Attacks on the Press 2010: Belarus.
http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/attacks-on-the-press-2010-belarus.php
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imprisoned in December 2010. Security agents stormed newsrooms of major outlets, including
Radio for Belarus and the satellite television channel Belsat.” As of March 2011, 42 people,
including ex-presidential candidates, their campaign members and journalists, are facing
criminal charges for organizing mass riots and participating in social unrest.

The Belarus Democracy Act
The Belarus Democracy Act is a statement of U.S. policy towards Lukashenko’s
regime, with special focus on assistance to promote democracy and civil society in Belarus, and
apply sanctions against the government of Belarus. Its aim is “to provide for the promotion of
democracy, human rights, and rule of law in the Republic of Belarus and for the consolidation
and strengthening of Belarus sovereignty and independence.” 14 President George W. Bush
stated in 2004: “The Belarus Democracy Act will help us support those within Belarus who are
working toward democracy. We welcome this legislation as a means to bolster friends of
freedom and to nurture the growth of democratic values, habits, and institutions within
Belarus.” 15
The original Act was signed by President Bush and passed by the U.S. Congress on
October 4, 2004. 16 The U.S. Congress amended versions of the Act in 2006, 17 2008 18 and
2011. 19

14

U.S. Congress. (2004). H.R. 854: Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-854
15
The White House Office of the Press secretary. (2004). President Bush's statement on the Belarus
Democracy Act of 2004. http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2004/October/20041022100536btrueveceR0.8822595.html
16
Ibid.
17
U.S. Congress. (2006). H.R.5948:Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5948
18 U.S. Congress. (2008). H.R.5970 - Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2008.
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h5970/show
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The U.S. government’s assessment of the Belarus regime is clearly negative: “the
government of Belarus has engaged in a pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms 20.” Consequently, the Act authorizes U.S. assistance for
democratic opposition in Belarus and applies economic sanctions against the Belarusian
government.
The Belarus Democracy Act pays close attention to the suppression of freedom of
speech and press in Belarus: “the government of Belarus has attempted to maintain a monopoly
over the country’s information space, targeting independent media, including independent
journalists, for systematic reprisals and elimination, while suppressing the right to freedom of
speech and expression of those dissenting from the dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko, and
adopted laws restricting the media, including the Internet, in a manner inconsistent with
international human rights agreements.” 21

The Belarusian Media Landscape and Media Freedom
According to Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2010, Belarus is
among the lowest-ranked countries: #154 of 178, and in regard to media freedom, stating in
part, “the [Belarusian] regime makes no concession to civil society and continues… to put
pressure on the country’s few remaining independent media outlets.” 22

19

U.S. Congress. (2011). H.R.515:Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2011.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-515&tab=summary
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Reporters Without Borders. (2010). World Press Freedom Index 2010.
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf
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Another widely recognized report on international media freedom, the IREX’s Media
Sustainability Index, 23 gave Belarus an overall score of 0.96 out of 4.0, on a scale from 0 to 4.0
(where 0 is no freedom of the press), placing the country into the category of “unsustainable,
anti-free” press systems. And according to Freedom House’ Freedom of the Press Index
2010, 24Belarus is ranked 189, along with Cuba, Libya, Burma, Turkmenistan and North Korea.

State Control of Mass Media
The reason for Belarus’ low media freedom ratings is the strict control that Belarusian
authorities gained over the mass media system since Lukashenko’s election in 1994.
Lukashenko clearly and unequivocally stated his position on media freedom when he spoke to a
group of journalism students at the Belarusian State University in 2008: “Media hold the
weapon of a most destructive power. They must be controlled by the state”. 25
According to IREX’s Media Sustainability Index, the Belarusian government restricts
the work of media through its control or manipulation of printing houses, distribution systems,
advertising, taxation, and of editorial policy, e.g. outright censorship, dissemination of falseinformation, the filing of libel law suites, and restrictions of access to information. The Index
succinctly states,
“Economic conditions for media are not equal, subscription and distribution systems are
monopolized or controlled by the state on a large scale and limit access for non-state

23

IREX. (2010). Media Sustainability Index 2010: the Development of Sustainable Independent Media
in Europe and Eurasia.
http://www.irex.org/system/files/Europe%20MSI%202010_Full%20Version.pdf
24
Freedom House. (2011). Freedom of the Press 2010.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2010/FOTP2010Global&RegionalTables.pdf
25
International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus. (2009). For Free and Fair Media in
Belarus: Mission Report.
http://baj.by/index.php?module=p&type=file&func=get&tid=6&fid=pdf&pid=33
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media, allocation of broadcast licenses and frequencies is neither transparent nor equal,
access to information is restricted, accreditation of journalists (working for foreign
media) is restricted, legislation on defamation and extremism creates an environment of
self-censorship and thus lack of publicly available information on important issues.” 26
A new Belarus Media Law, labeled “draconian” by the Freedom House’ Freedom of the
Press 2010 report, was approved in 2008 and took effect in 2009. The new law set up a
number of obstacles for independent journalists and media outlets, and shortened the list of
journalistic rights.
According to the International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus report,
For Free and Fair Media in Belarus,24 some of the control measures include: new burdensome
procedures for the accreditation process (journalists have to go through a three-step process and
could be denied accreditation without any explanation); increased authority for penalizing
journalists and mass media outlets (for vague reasons like “dissemination of inaccurate
information that might cause harm to state and public interests,” journalist could be fined,
operations of media outlets could be suspended or terminated); the requirement for all print and
broadcast media outlets to re-register with the Ministry of Information (at least half a dozen
independent media outlets were denied registration); there are also sanctions for violating
requirements of “compliance with reality” for media materials; and foreign share in media
ownership is restricted to 30 percent.

26

Ibid.
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Repressive legal regulations are the norm in the Media Law of 2009. According to the
International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus report For Free and Fair Media
in Belarus27, other laws detrimental to freedom of speech/press include:
-

The Law on Public Service, which restricts public and media access to information.
All state organizations are obliged to have spokespersons who present official
information; these spokespersons are linked directly to the Presidential
administration and have to follow the official ideological doctrine. Furthermore,
state officials often refuse to provide information to independent mass media.

-

The Law on Counteraction to Extremism, which is commonly used to impede press
freedom: publishing materials that are considered an “extreme and present danger to
the state or the people” could result in fines or closure of the news outlet.

-

The Criminal Code: Articles 367, 368, 369, 369-1 and 193-1. Several articles
provide for criminal defamation for “Calumny against the President of the Republic
of Belarus, Insults against the President of the Republic of Belarus, Insults against
the representative of the authorities, and discrediting the Republic of Belarus”.
These articles are widely used by the Belarusian government to prosecute
independent media outlets.

-

Another problem is the courts, where judges are appointed directly by President
Lukashenko, and offer little or no support for independent media.

27

Ibid.
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The Belarusian Media Model
According to Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s classic Four Theories of the Press
(1956), the Belarusian media model could be identified as an authoritarian model: the function
of the state-run media is to support the policies of the authorities; state-run media fosters
support for the president, social and national unity; the state has a right to control mass media
by the enforcing repressive media law and other means.
The backwardness of the political regime explains why the media system in Belarus
could be analyzed within the classical framework of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm developed
more than half a century ago. Although significant progress has been achieved in the studies of
media systems since the Four Theories of the Press was published (for example, Comparing
Media Systems, by Hallin & Mancini, 2004), most current research is either fully focused on
Western media systems (including North America and Western Europe), or it includes postcommunist countries that embarked on democratization and adopted Western values.
Obviously, Belarus does not fall into either category. According to Jakubowicz’s classification
(2007), it falls into the category of non-competitive regimes, and its media system is very
different from the media systems in Western Europe, or even from that of the Baltic states, the
Ukraine or Poland, Belarus’s closest neighbors.

The Mass Media Landscape
A significant number of media outlets are registered in Belarus: 1,353 print and 240
broadcasting outlets as of March 2011, according to Belarusian Ministry of Information. 28
However, as Manaev (2009) indicates, the mass media do not contribute substantially to the

28

Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus. (2011).Registered mass media outlets.
http://www.mininform.gov.by/rus/smi/
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development of democracy and freedom in Belarus. To the contrary, due to strict governmental
control, the mass media contribute to the strengthening of authoritarianism.
The Belarusian mass media landscape is dominated by state-run media outlets whose
editors are appointed by the President or by local authorities subservient to him. This fact has
an enormous influence on editorial policy. As the International Fact-Finding Mission to the
Republic of Belarus report For Free and Fair Media in Belarus indicates, state-run media
outlets are in a beneficial position compared to the independent media: they enjoy subsidized
rent, salaries, better distribution and printing, and tax exemptions.
Broadcasting in Belarus remains under strict governmental control: TV channels are
either state-owned, or Russian-owned. According to the Freedom House’ Freedom of the Press
2010 report, “the state maintains a virtual monopoly on domestic broadcast media, which
consistently glorify Lukashenko and vilify the opposition. Only state media broadcast
nationwide, and the content of smaller television and radio stations is tightly restricted.”
About two-thirds of registered newspapers and magazines are non-state owned, but the
majority of these outlets cover entertainment and special topics. 29 There are only about 20
national and local independent newspapers that deal with social and political issues. The
comparison of the circulation numbers of the most popular state-run newspapers Sovetskaya
Byelorussia (“Советская Белоруссия”) and the most popular independent newspaper
Narodnaya Volya (“Народная Воля”) illustrates the difference in the size of the audience of
state-run versus that of independent media: 2,000,000 to 25,000 respectively (Manaev,
Manayeva, Yuran, 2010).

29

International Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Belarus. (2009). For Free and Fair Media in
Belarus: Mission Report.
http://baj.by/index.php?module=p&type=file&func=get&tid=6&fid=pdf&pid=33
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This study examines the mass media’s role and efficacy in building public confidence in
social institutions, and outlines the perceptions of the institutions that the public is getting from
the mass media. Public opinion polls data analysis indicates levels of public confidence in
institutions and illustrates the importance of print media as a source of information for
Belarusian public. Comparison of the results of content analysis and public opinion data
analysis made it possible to determine if there is a connection between media coverage of and
public confidence in social institutions.
The main research question is how are social institutions covered by the Belarusian
media and if there is a connection between media coverage of these institutions and the
level of public confidence in them. In order to answer the main question, a set of subquestions were addressed:
1. RQ1: How are selected social institutions covered by the Belarusian mass
media?
2. RQ2: What is the level of confidence of the Belarusian public toward selected
social institutions?
3. RQ3: What is the level of trust of the Belarusian public toward news media?
What are the characteristics of media consumption among Belarusian public?
What are the main sources of information about internal affairs for Belarusian
public?
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Content Analysis
In this study, elements of qualitative and quantitative content analysis are combined.
The qualitative content analysis allows studying themes that were used by the mass
media covering selected social institutions and demonstrates the difference in coverage
between state-run and independent newspapers. This type of analysis allowed sorting out
themes that promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, or solution to an issue, and could
stimulate support or opposition to an issue.

The content analysis suggested the themes

outlined. Themes derived from data analysis, and the researcher has characterized the press
coverage by citing quotes and examples. Themes that were found in analyzed articles were
categorized as negative, positive, and neutral. The overall tone in each theme was created by
using direct evaluation of a social institution via the use of epithets; by presenting the
institution as effective or ineffective, as a “problem solver” or a “problem creator”; by covering
successes or failures of the institution; by focusing on positive or negative outcomes of actions
of the institution.
According to Berelson (1952), quantitative content analysis “is a research technique for
the objective systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of the
communication”; it allows for the examination of social interactions based on texts. A
conceptual (or so-called thematic) type of content analysis was used in this study, because it
allows the researcher to look at the occurrence of selected items within a text. The quantitative
content analysis shows how the coverage is constructed by the mass media by looking at the
presence of several categories:
●

What is the type of publication: news, opinion, press release, official document?

●

Is there negative or positive evaluation of the institution?
27

●

What is the main topic of the article?

●

What is the main subject of the article?

●

Does the story refer to the institution as an organization or is the reference personified?

●

What is the primary scope of activity of institutions in the article?
Four institutions were chosen for the study: two institutions with high levels of

confidence (according to IISEPS data) that represent the state (the President and the military)
and two institutions with low level of confidence that represent the civil society (independent
labor unions and opposition political parties).
Articles published in a three months period, January – March 2010, were selected for
analysis. The beginning of 2010 was a “calm” period between elections in which the mass
media did not concentrate on covering certain institutions, such as the presidency or the
National Assembly. 30 That allowed the researcher to analyze regular, everyday coverage in
selected newspapers.
Four major newspapers were chosen as sources for this study. As results of public
opinion polls from Belarus demonstrate, about 65% Belarusians get their news from print
media and most people trust print media as a reliable news source (see Manaev, 2009). The
structure of the Belarusian media landscape (see Manaev, 2006, 2009; Manayeva, Manaev,
Yuran, 2010) influenced the choice of sources for this study, including two nation-wide staterun newspapers with highest circulation numbers Sovetskaya Belorussiya/Belarus Segodnya
(«Беларусь Сегодня/Советская Белоруссия»)and Zvyazda («Звязда»), and two independent
nation-wide newspapers: Narodnaya Volya (“Народная Воля”) and Belorusy I Rynok

30

Belarusian Parliament
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(“Белорусы и Рынок”). All four newspapers have online archives that are free to public and
served as the source of articles in this study.
The following key search words (in both Russian and Belarusian languages) 31 were
used to select articles for analysis (see Appendix A for a full list):
●

For

the

Presidency:

President,

Lukashenko,

Alexander

Grigorievich

(Lukashendo’s given name), Head of State;
●

For the military: army, military, draft, military service, military registration and
enlistment office, armed forces, generals and other military ranks;

●

For the opposition political parties: titles of registered political parties and
names of their leaders;

●

For independent labor unions: titles of registered independent labor unions and
names of their leaders.

Public Opinion Data Analysis
The public opinion data that was used in this study was provided by the Belarusian
polling organization, Independent Institute for Social-Economic and Political Studies. IISEPS
was established in Minsk, Belarus in February 1992 by a group of academics, journalists,
politicians and businessmen. IISEPS is currently registered as a public institution in the
Lithuanian Republic, but still conducts public opinion research in Belarus. 32 Data from IISEPS
quarterly public opinion polls are available on the organization’s website (www.iiseps.org) and
are open to public.

31

This is a short list of key search words. For the full list see Appendix A.

32

In April 2005 IISEPS had been shut down by the Belarus Supreme Court. Later that year the institute was
registered in Lithuania under the same name and with the same mission. See details at
http://www.iiseps.org/ebullet05-2.html
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Question about confidence in social institutions, media consumption and trust for mass
media are included in IISEPS national polls, which are conducted quarterly, with random
samples of approximately 1,500 respondents, and a sample error of 0.03. 33
The following social institutions, that is their media coverage and public opinion data on
them, were chosen for this study: the military, the President, opposition political parties,
independent labor unions, state-run media and independent media.
The time frame for the secondary data analysis covered the period of 2008, 2009 and
2010. Data on media consumption was obtained from the polls of 2008, which allowed
exploring media consumption patterns that were formed before, and presumably existed during,
the time frame chosen for the content analysis. 34 Data on confidence in social institutions came
from the polls conducted in December 2010, several months after the analyzed articles had
been published, when possible media effects could have taken place already. The last set of
data on trust for state-run and independent media was drawn from two sets of polls conducted
in 2009 and 2010, which allowed for identifying patterns in trust for media among the
Belarusian public.

Justification of Methods
Since there were two separate research areas in this study – (1) media coverage of
selected social institutions and (2) public opinion about these institutions, along with trust for
news media, and some characteristics of media consumption among Belarusian public – two
methods were used in this research: content analysis and public opinion polls data analysis.

33

See details of methodology at http://iiseps.org/emethods.html.
Polls are conducted by IISEPS quarterly. Questionnaire varies from poll to poll. Thus there was no data on
media consumption available from a period closer (and at the same time, prior) to the time-frame selected for
content analysis.

34
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Using a combination of content analysis and public opinion polls data analysis in this research
project allowed for the study of how Belarusian newspapers are covering selected social
institutions, and to compare media coverage with public confidence in selected institutions.
The first method was a content analysis of Belarusian press that incorporated elements
of qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Qualitative analysis allowed seeing how mass
media cover social institutions. Quantitative analysis allowed examining how the coverage is
constructed by determining the presence of certain categories. The combination of these two
methods in content analysis helped obtain a better understanding of media coverage of selected
social institutions.
The second method employed in this study is the data analyses of results of public
opinion polls from Belarus 35. Using survey data allowed for the studying of several important
issues, like the level of confidence of the Belarusian public toward social institutions, the level
of trust toward news media, and characteristics of media consumption among Belarusian
public.

35

The author of this study used public opinion data in a form of SPSS files provided by IISPES. Using the data
provided, author acquired cross tabulations and other descriptive statistics using SPPSS software. See Appendix D
for the results.
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CHAPTER V
RESUTS
A total of 1,198 articles from four Belarusian newspapers were analyzed in this study.
The search for articles that were mentioning selected institutions provided results that were
worth noting before going content analysis. Thus, in the three-month period, independent
newspapers published the following number of articles about selected institutions:
•

406 articles about the presidency and President Lukashenko;

•

40 articles about the Belarusian military;

•

253 articles about opposition political parties and their leaders;

•

12 articles about independent labor unions.

During January – March 2010, independent newspapers covered all four selected
institutions, but the amount of coverage for each institution differed from one newspaper to
another. Most articles were about President Lukashenko and opposition political parties.
The coverage by state-run newspapers was quite different from that of the independent
newspapers:
•

378 articles about the presidency and President Lukashenko (28 articles less than
the independent newspapers);

•

89 articles about Belarusian military (49 articles more than the independent
newspapers);

•

20 articles about opposition political parties and their leaders (233 articles less
than the independent newspapers);

•

0 articles about independent labor unions.
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State-run newspapers were excessively covering President Lukashenko; they paid close
attention to the military as well. At the same time, their coverage of the institutions of civil
society (including Political Parties and Labor Unions) was distinctly poor: there were only 20
articles about Opposition political parties, and no articles about independent labor unions.

Qualitative Content Analysis
Results of the qualitative content analysis are presented as an analytical description
followed by tables of identified themes in the state-run and independent newspapers. The use of
tables to introduce the findings accentuates the differences between coverage in state-run and
independent newspapers allowing for the presentation of the differences and similarities in
state-run and independent newspapers themes.
The President in State-run Newspapers
Three major themes were found in articles published in the state-run newspapers about
Presidents Lukashenko. Two themes were explicitly positive (themes 1 and 3): presenting
President Lukashenko as an effective leader and decision-maker. Within these themes,
advances in Belarusian internal and external affairs were directly attributed to Lukashenko’s
leadership (example from Sovetskaya Belorussiya, article 145: “Today the Shklov area looks
like a huge construction site… thanks to President Lukashenko”). The third theme was neutral
and touched upon routine work of President Lukashenko (such as signing documents, giving
speeches on different occasions, etc.) or provided full texts of official documents signed by the
president. All three themes were almost equally represented in the state run newspapers: theme
1 was found in 35.2% of articles, theme 2 in 34.9%, and theme 3 in 29.9% of articles.
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The President in Independent Newspapers
The picture of the presidency painted in the independent newspapers was nearly the
opposite of that in the state-run: analysis revealed two distinct negative themes, one neutral and
one positive. Two negative themes presented President Lukashenko as a dictator (theme4,
example from Narodnaya Volya, article 89: “Belarusian authorities banned public discussions
of the new decree. The situation now resembles Stalin’s or Brezhnev’s times, when everybody
was really proud of the USSR constitution and were constantly talking about human rights,
while repressive mechanisms annihilated and oppressed millions of citizens”) and attributed
problems that Belarus is facing directly to bad and ineffective leadership by Lukashenko
(theme 1). Theme1 was found in 38.4% of articles, and theme 4 in 14% of stories. The two
negative themes together dominated the coverage: 52.4% of articles presented President
Lukashenko in negative themes. The neutral theme (theme 2) was the same as in state-run
newspapers: it’s a description of President’s daily routine and official documents without any
evaluation connotations. This theme was found in 38.2 % of all articles about Lukashenko. The
theme that presented President Lukashenko in a positive way (as an effective leader and
decision-maker) was found in 9.4% of articles.
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Table 1. Themes: The President
State-run newspapers

Independent newspapers

Theme 1 (positive): Progress and

Theme 1 (negative): Problems that Belarus is

success in Belarusian affairs as a result

facing as a result of bad leadership by

of good leadership by Lukashenko

Lukashenko (including themes such as “problems

(including themes such as “progress and

in foreign relations as a result of bad leadership of

success in domestic affairs as a result of

Lukashenko,” “domestic problems as a result of bad

great leadership of Lukashenko,”

leadership of Lukashenko,” “Lukashenko is

“progress and success in foreign relations

ignoring major problems,” “critique of

as a result of great leadership of

Lukashenko’s decisions / statements, Lukashenko is

Lukashenko,” and “Lukashenko as a

not holding his word/ breaks his own rules,” and

patron and benefactor”)

“rhetoric, not supported by actions”)

Theme 2 (neutral): Routine work/official documents (including themes such as “official
document signed by President Lukashenko,” “routine work of the president,” and “problems in
foreign relations (without explaining whose fault is it)”
Theme 3 (positive): Presidents Lukashenko as a leader the main decision maker in the
country (including themes such as “Lukashenko is making right decisions,” “everybody
reports to Lukashenko,” “Lukashenko gives instructions and assignments,” “Lukashenko as a
fount of wisdom,” and “Lukashenko is not satisfied with performed work, critiques his
subordinates and other branches of power”)
Theme 4 (negative): Lukashenko as a dictator
and a supporter of rogue regimes (including
themes such as “Lukashenko’s regime,”
authoritarian/ totalitarian methods of control over
state and society,” “Lukashenko as an oppressor of
national Belarusian culture and language,” and
“Lukashenko as a friend and supporter of rogue
regimes”)
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The Military in State-run Newspapers
Qualitative content analysis revealed that the Belarusian military was mostly presented
in the context of positive themes. The most prominent positive theme in which the Belarusian
military was presented was military history and World War II, encompassing 43.8% of stories.
The second positive theme presented the Belarusian military as “a good place to be in” and
focused on its achievements; this theme was detected in 18% of the articles. A neutral theme
covered military routines (such as staff changes, scheduled activities of the military recruitment
office, etc.) without any evaluations (38.2% of stories). It is worth noting that articles about the
military frequently mentioned President Lukashenko, emphasizing the connection between the
two.
The Military in Independent Newspapers
Independent newspapers covered the Belarusian military mostly in the context of
negative themes. The most prominent negative theme (theme 4) presented the military as a tool
of political pressure both inside of the country and in the international arena, with special
attention being given to the use of military draft as a tool of pressure on political opposition
(example from Narodnaya Volya, article 361: “It’s important to note that since 2008 the socalled ‘political draft’ is used by the Belarusian authorities against young political activists”).
This theme was found in 50% of the articles. Another negative theme (theme 2) focused on
different problems within the military and was found in 12.5% of stories. A neutral theme,
found in 22.5% of stories, covered the military routines without any evaluations, and a positive
theme presented the military in articles that dealt with military history and World War II
(12.5% of articles).
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Table 2. Themes: The Military
State-run newspapers

Independent newspapers

Theme 1 (positive): Belarusian nation and the military history (including themes
such as the “exploits of WWII veterans and other heroes, promoting Soviet heritage”)
Theme 2 (positive): achievements of

Theme 2 (negative): defections of the

Belarusian military (including themes

Belarusian military (including themes

such as “technology, international trade and such as “military as bad place to be,”
cooperation,” “women in the military,” and

“disrespect for personal rights and rights of

“army as a good place to be in”)

citizens in military,” and “degradation of
the Belarusian military; obvious need to cut
it down”)

Theme 3 (neutral): military routine (including themes such as “law and regulations,
promotions, congratulations and official declarations,” and “Lukashenko gives orders and
controls”)
Theme 4 (negative): the military as a tool
of pressure (including themes such as
“military as a tool in the international arena
used for economic and political pressure,”
“military (draft) as a tool of political
pressure”)
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Opposition Political Parties in State-run Newspapers
State-run newspapers published only 20 stories about the opposition political parties
during the three months period of this study. Most of these articles (80%) covered the
opposition political parties within the scope of negative themes, presenting parties the as
passive and ineffective (example from Zvyazda article 275: “There are almost no candidates
from political parties in the local elections. Parties are sleeping… And all the new changes in
the laws that make it easier for parties to participate in elections – parties are not using any of
those opportunities”). Several other articles mentioned opposition political parties in data bared
reports on local elections and did not contain any evaluation.
Opposition Political Parties in Independent Newspapers
Analysis detected several themes in the articles about opposition political parties
published by independent newspapers. A positive theme presented parties as active participants
in the political process and the construction of civil society, and was found in 28.1% of stories.
Another theme (theme 3) presented political parties as targets of political repressions (example
from Narodnaya Volya, article 437: “As soon as activists of the Young Front took out posters,
the special police forces attacked demonstrators and started to arrest people. Using brutal force
police dragged people into busses and beat them up”). This theme was found in 23.3% of
stories and was presented in a non-evaluative way. Approximately 43% of the articles
contained a neutral theme of party routines (such as party meetings, structural changes within
parties, registration for upcoming local elections, etc). A negative theme that presented political
parties as passive and ineffective was found in 4.7% of stories. Thus, most articles about
opposition political parties in independent newspapers employed neutral or positive themes.
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Table 3. Themes: Opposition Political Parties
State-run newspapers

Independent newspapers

Theme 1 (negative): ineffectiveness of political parties (including themes such as
“scattered nature of political opposition/conflicts between parties,” and “passiveness and
inactivity of political parties”)
Theme 2 (neutral): party routine (including themes such as “Activities within parties,”
and “reports on local elections”)
Theme 3 (neutral): opposition parties as
a target of political repressions
Theme 4 (positive): parties as active
participants is civil society and political
process (including themes such as “parties
as initiators of public actions,” “parties as
alternative diplomats,” “parties as human
rights advocates,” and “parties critique of
the Belarusian authorities”)
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Independent Labor Unions in State-run Newspapers
During the three months period this study encompasses, no articles covering the
independent labor unions were found in the state-run newspapers.
Independent Labor Unions in Independent Newspapers
Coverage of the labor unions was neutral or positive in independent newspapers, though
only a small number of articles about independent labor unions were published (12 articles in
the three months period). Three themes were equally represented. First, “independent Labor
Unions as part of the democratic political opposition;” second, unions were presented as
“advocates of human rights” (example from Narodnaya Volyaarticle 370: “Belarusian labor
union in the radio-electronic industry workers continue to support activist Yuri Loban, who was
fired by BelAz administration. The union collects donations and is ready to defend worker’s
rights in the court.”); and third, unions were depicted as a “target of political pressure by the
Belarusian authorities.”

Quantitative Content Analysis
Results of the quantitative content analysis 36 provided additional perspectives on the
findings discussed earlier and contributed to the understanding of the mechanisms involved in
constructing coverage by state-run and independent newspapers in Belarus.
The category “Publication Type” 37 demonstrates that in the state-run and independent
newspapers different actors (newspapers themselves, authorities, and opposition political
leaders) are involved in constructing themes.

36

This section contains selected results of the quantitative content analysis that are meaningful and important for
this study. All results of the content analysis are in Appendix C.
37
All categories of quantitative content analysis are in Appendix C.
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Table 4. President in Independent Newspapers. Publication Type
Publication Type

Frequency

Percent

News Article

369

90.9%

Opinion Piece

37

9.1%

Press Release

0

0%

Official Document

0

0%

Other

0

0%

Total

406

100.0%

Table 5. President in State-run Newspapers. Publication type
Publication Type

Frequency

Percent

News Article

189

50.0%

Opinion Piece

33

8.7%

Press Release

144

38.1%

Official Document

11

2.9%

Other

1

0.3%

Total

378

100.0%
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While

independent newspapers mostly published news articles and some opinion

pieces, e.g. editorials and interviews with experts (Table 4) in state-run newspapers, press
releases and full texts of official documents (such as presidential decrees 38 and other legislative
acts) make up more than 40% of publications about president (Table 5). By publishing press
releases and other official documents, that were created by Lukashenko’s administration,
without any alterations or additional information, state-run newspapers yield some control over
framing to the authorities, thus providing them with a platform for political propaganda.
The next category of content analysis, “Nature of Actions,” (Table 6) presents how the
actions and decisions made by the President were presented in newspapers. By providing
different prognoses about future outcomes of the President’s actions or discussing different
consequences of his decisions, independent and state-run newspapers were able to give indirect
evaluations of the President, thus creating positive and/or negative coverage.
Table 6. President in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Attempt/ Intent to do Good

76

20.1%

Have/ Will have Positive Outcome

138

36.5%

Have/ will have Negative Outcome

0

0%

Actions are not being taken, though necessary

0

0%

Neutral/ no outcome could be inferred

164

43.4%

Total

378

100.0%

38

In Belarus Presidential decrees are regarded as legislation.
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Table 7. President in Independent Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Attempt/ Intent to do Good

43

10.6%

Have/ will have Positive Outcome

14

3.4%

Have/ will have Negative Outcome

108

26.6%

Actions are not being taken, though necessary

54

13.3%

Neutral/no outcome could be inferred

187

46.1%

Total

406

100%

Given the nature of what was published, it is not surprising that in state-run newspapers,
in the majority of instances, the actions taken by the President were described as beneficial (or
potentially beneficial) for the country and the Belarusian people (Table 6). At the same time,
when discussing the same events, independent newspapers were constructing negative themes
by presenting the President’s actions as wrong, harmful, or potentially dangerous; or by
pointing out the fact that the President does not always pay attention to important social
problems.
Similarly, independent and state-run newspapers were giving indirect evaluations of the
Belarusian military and opposition parties 39 by providing different prognoses about future
outcomes of their actions.
Public Opinion Data Analysis
Trust in the media by the Belarusian public

39

For details, see appendix C.
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Even though state-run and independent media in Belarus are not comparable in audience
size, it looks as if they enjoy roughly similar levels of public trust. In June 2009, 45.3% of
respondents said that they trusted independent media, whereas 35.5 % expressed distrust. At the
same time, 44.7% of respondents declared that they trusted state-run media, while 42.1% said
that they distrusted them. A year and a half later, by December 2010, trust for both kinds of
media had risen: 46.3% of respondents declared their trust for independent media, and 52.9%
for state-run media.
Media consumption and sources of information of the Belarusian public
The data that was used in this section came from several IISEPS national public opinion
polls conducted in 2008. According to this data, print media remain an influential source of
information for the Belarusian public. A reported 60.5% of respondents get information about
life in Belarus and abroad “most often from newspapers.” Among them, 85.7% get information
about life in Belarus from the state-run media, and 35.4% get it from the independent media.
The most popular newspaper is Sovetskaya Belorussiya: more than a quarter of respondents
read it “daily” or “often”, and 16% “from time to time.”
Interdependence between trust in the mass media and confidence in social institutions
A crucial aspect of the public opinion analyses involves the interdependence between
trust for independent and state-run mass media, and confidence in selected social institutions.
The author of this thesis was guided by the assumption that trust in media outlets and trust in
messages these outlets disseminate are closely related. In other words, trust in the source,
influences trust in the message.
The data that was used in this section came from IISEPS December 2010 national
public opinion poll. Following are the results by institution.
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Table 8. Trust for Mass Media and Confidence in Selected Social Institutions
Of those who trust independent media

Of those who trust state-run media

The President
48.8% have confidence in the President

89.3% have confidence in the President

and 42.2% do not.

and 7.1% do not.
The Military

50.4% have confidence in Belarusian

76% have confidence in Belarusian

Military and 36.9% do not.

military and 15.5% do not.
Opposition Political Parties

22.9% have confidence in opposition

15% have confidence in opposition

political parties and 59.4% do not.

political parties and 72% do not.

Independent Labor Unions
47.3% have confidence in the independent

42.3% have confidence in the independent

labor unions and 32.6% do not.

labor unions and 35.4% do not.
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Results of public opinion polls showed that people who trust state-run media also have
very strong confidence in the President. Almost 90% of them declared their confidence in the
President, while only 7.1% had no confidence in Lukashenko. These people have a much
higher level of confidence in the President than do people who trust independent media.
Among those who trust state-run media, the number of people who have confidence in the
President is nearly twice as high as that among people who trust independent media. The
number of people who do not have confidence in the President is more than four times smaller
among those who trust independent media. Given that state-run media present the President
almost exclusively in the context of positive themes and the independent media seldom address
the President’s “achievements” and mostly concentrate on his failures and shortcomings, a
strong connection between media coverage of the President and levels of confidence in him is
detected. Although other important factors may be involved and it is impossible to prove causal
relationship at this stage, the observed connection between media coverage and public
confidence in social institutions is evident.
The case of the public’s confidence or lack thereof in the military is somewhat similar.
Most of the people (71%) who trust state-run media are confident in the military, whereas the
levels of confidence in the military among those who trust independent media are significantly
lower. The number of people who do not have confidence in the military is two times smaller
among those who trust state-run media compared to the audience of the independent media. In
light of mostly positive or neutral coverage of Belarusian military in state-run newspapers and
mostly negative coverage in independent print media, different levels of confidence in the
institution provide additional prove of the connection between media coverage and public
opinion.
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Confidence in oppositional political parties is low in both groups. Even though logic
dictates that the difference here should be more noticeable, public opinion data are consistent
with the results of the content analysis. Coverage of opposition political parties in independent
newspapers could be described as mostly neutral (with 66% of articles employing neutral
themes); thus this independent media do not urge the public to think of parties in a positive or a
negative way. The amount of media coverage an institution gets may play a significant role in
public perception of this institution. Even though state-run media write about opposition parties
mostly in the context of negative themes, the amount of coverage is not ample and is likely to
be ignored by the public.
There is almost no difference in the levels of confidence in independent labor unions
between people who trust independent media and those who trust state-run media. Lack of
information on independent labor unions in both state-run and independent newspapers might
serve as a possible explanation alongside with a lack of personal experiences with such
institution among the Belarusian public.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Social scientists agree that public confidence in social institutions is a crucial element in
building a democratic society. This is especially true for transitional societies, including postcommunist countries, because the lack of public confidence in newly emerged democratic
institutions can interfere with democratic development of these societies.
Although, over the years, different theories explaining the phenomenon of public
confidence in social institutions was developed, these theories tend to ignore the role that mass
media play in building public confidence.
The ultimate goal of this study was to prove that there is a connection between mass
media coverage and public confidence in social institutions.
Combined results of content analyses and public opinion polls data analyses suggested
that there is an evident connection between media coverage and public confidence in social
institutions.
Content analyses demonstrated that the state-run newspapers publish a great number of
articles about President Lukashenko, covering him within the scope of explicitly positive
themes. He was presented as an effective leader and decision-maker. The successes in
Belarusian internal and external affairs were directly attributed to Lukashenko’s leadership. As
results of public opinion polls demonstrate, the President enjoys a high level of confidence
(90%) among people who trust state-run media, but not among those who trust independent
media.
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Independent newspapers present President Lukashenko in a different light. He is
covered within the scope of two distinct negative themes: he is being depicted as a dictator and
an ineffective leader. According to public opinion polls, only 42% of people who trust
independent media have confidence in the President.
Given that state-run newspapers present the President almost exclusively within positive
themes and independent newspapers seldom address the President’s achievements, mostly
concentrating on his failures and shortcomings, a strong connection between media coverage of
the President and levels of confidence in him appears to exist.
Examining media coverage and public opinion about other social institutions (the
military and opposition political parties) provided similar results, suggesting a connection
between media coverage and public confidence.
Even though causal effects are still to be tested, ignoring the role of media in building
public confidence in social institutions would be a mistake for scholars in all relevant
disciplines.
Although, from a mass communication perspective, several theories can be used to
explain the apparent connection between the media coverage and the public opinion that was
revealed in the study, 40 the spiral of silence theory is of special interest to the author. This
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According to the framing theory, mass media cover certain issues and thus make them more salient,
and frames these issues by interpreting them and placing facts within the field of meaning (see Davis, 1975;
Entman, 1993; Fairhurst & Star, 1996; Miller, 1997; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; D'Angelo, 2002). Content
analysis demonstrated that the state-run and independent newspapers are using different themes when presenting
information about social institutions. The difference was especially noticeable in the coverage of the president and
oppositional political parties. State-run and oppositional newspapers presented the same topics and issues (for
example – local elections), but they presented the news in different (sometimes opposite) ways. Within the
gatekeeping theory the gatekeepers, such as media or authorities, control the flow of information and decide which
information will be available to the public (see Lewin, 1947; White, 1964; McCombs et al, 1976; Willis, 1987). In
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theory is focused on the mechanism and social implications of the media influence on public
opinion. As previous research (Manaev, Manayeva, Yuran, 2010) demonstrated, there is a
strong evidence of the spiral of silence effects in Belarus.
According to the spiral of silence theory, (Noelle-Neumann, l973, 1993; Lee, 1989;
Scheufele & Moy, 2000) people are less likely to voice their opinion if they think that they are
in the minority and the media play a great part in forming individuals' perception of the opinion
climate. With the help of mass media vocal majority intimidates others into silence. This theory
is useful in understanding the situation in Belarus. State-run mass media dominate the media
sphere in Belarus, and there is a shortage of the alternative sources of information. As the
content analysis demonstrated, activities of the opposition political parties and independent
labor unions are either not covered by the state-run newspapers, or parties are presented as
ineffective and passive actors. That is where the spiral of silence mechanisms come into play: if
people with “protest potential” who are not satisfied with Belarusians authorities read state-run
newspapers or watch state-run television, they will get the impression that nothing is going on

Belarus state-run newspapers keep silent about repression against oppositional political parties and independent
labor unions. Moreover, by publishing unchanged press releases from the Lukashenko’s administration, state-run
newspapers give control over framing to Belarusian authorities, thus providing them with additional tool of direct
control over media content.
Agenda setting theory states that the media tell the public not what to think, but what to think about (see
McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1977; McCombs 1972, 1982; McCombs & Weaver, 1973, 1985; Rogers & Dearing,
1988; Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg, 1995; McCombs, 2004). As the results of content analysis demonstrated,
Belarusian state-run newspapers almost completely ignore institutions of civil society (the oppositional political
parties and independent labor unions). Activities of those institutions are not covered by the media, and thus they
are getting excluded from the public discourse. At the same time, state-run newspapers attribute most of
Belarusian accomplishments attribute those directly to the leadership of President Lukashenko, thus promoting an
image of Lukashenko as a thoughtful, caring and successful leader. The media dependency theory (Ball-Rokeach
& DeFleur, 1976; Donohew, Palmgreen, & Rayburn, 1987; Baran and Davis, 2009) states that the more a person
becomes dependent on the media to get his/her needs fulfilled, the more the media will become important for the
individual and the more influence it will have. Taking in consideration peculiarities of the Belarusian media
landscape, such as strict governmental control over state-run mass media and shortage of alternative sources of
information, this theory might be useful in explanation of the strong influence of the mass media on the public
opinion.
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in the public sphere – nobody is protesting, or is criticizing the authorities, opposition is weak
and inactive (or even that there is no opposition at all). As a consequence, people will either
stay silent and will not get engaged in political activities, or they might even line up with the
opinion that is presented by the predominant media outlets and seemingly shared by the
majority of Belarusians.
Although studying the influence of mass media on the public’s confidence in social
institutes is important from an academic perspective (generating new knowledge), the results
could also be applied in a number of ways. For several decades, the promotion of democracy
around the world has been one of the most important elements of American foreign policy
doctrine. But further democratization is impossible without the proliferation and acceptance of
democratic values. Studying the ways authoritarian countries such as Belarus are using mass
media to influence public opinion could achieve a better understanding of the mechanisms at
work and could facilitate more effective interactions with publics in those countries.
Suggestions for Future Research
Research on the influence of mass media on public’s confidence in social institutions
could be enhanced in a number of ways.
Current research could be extended by including other institutions of civil society
covered by the media in a study in order to find out if there is a similar connection between
media coverage and public confidence in those institutions. Extending the study to other
countries and regions with similar media environments where media are partially or completely
controlled by the state (for example, Venezuela, Russia) could be done. This would allow
comparative testing of interactions between mass media and public trust in social institutions.
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It also might be useful to extend the research of connection between media coverage
and confidence in social institutions by exploring the spiral of silence effects on electoral
behavior.
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SEARCH WORDS
LIST
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APPENDIX B
RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS
Themes: President
- Problems with foreign relations as a result of bad leadership of Lukashenko (independent
newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok, 002. “Polish authorities stated that are not satisfied with
Lukashenko’s position on human rights violations”
•

Belorusy I Rynok 090. “Belarusian president isn’t about to change his positions. We can
only hope that it will not result in great financial loss for Belarus… But it probably
will”

•

Belorusy I Rynok 054. “Belarusian authorities failed to convince Russia to sign the
contract on Belarusian conditions”

- Lukashenko’s “regime”, authoritarian/ totalitarian methods of control over state and society
(independent newspapers)
• Narodnaya Volya, 011. “Independent experts are assured that Lukashenko’s decree #60
will be used as a tool of control and blocking alternative sources of information during
up-coming elections”
•

Narodnaya Volya 067. “Lukashenko’s dictatorship”

•

Narodnaya Volya 089. “Belarusian authorities banned public discussions of the new
decree. The situation now resembles Stalin’s or Brejnev’s times, when everybody was
really proud of the USSR constitution and were constantly talking about human rights,
while repressive mechanisms annihilated and oppressed millions of citizens”

- Domestic problems as a result of bad leadership of Lukashenko (independent newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok 020 “The effectiveness of new agrarian reform is very low”
•

Belorusy I Rynok 025 “Behind nice-looking facades of the main Minsk avenue once
major and well known industrial plants are languishing in poverty. Well-developed
instry, inherited by Belarus from the USSR is ruined by Belarusian authorities”

•

Narodnaya Volya 008 (story about new custom regulations, introduced by Lukashenko)
“One way or another, after the New Year Belarusian car dealers became depressed and
lost. They are scared by the uncertainty and ambiguity of new regulations”

- Lukashenko is not holding his word/ breaks his own rules (independent newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok 30 “Last year Lukashenko promised the public not to raise utility
rates. But the rates were raised”
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•

Narodnaya Volya 068 “It looks like the censorship is only applied to opposition web
sites”

•

Narodnaya Volya 081 “Will the regulations be canceled only on paper? We believe so.
Local authorities will continue to twist arms of local business”

- Critique of Lukashenko’s decisions / statements (independent newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok 088. “Decree 60 is all about control of information in Belarusian
society”
•

Narodnaya Volya 097. “Lukashenko’s general plan for Minsk development opens up
opportunities for corruption and potential damage to private sector”

•

Narodnaya Volya 071. “With the decree #60 Alexander Lukashenko created so many
problems, that it will take us years to solve them”

- Lukashenko as an oppressor of national Belarusian culture and language
• Narodnaya Volya 012. “At the press conference Lukashenko clearly stated his position
on Belarusian language: there will be no state support for Belarusian language.
•

Narodnaya Volya 087. “Last statements of President Lukashenko about Belarusian
language (at the December press conference) generated a lot of comments from our
readers; they were offended by Lukashenko’s positions”

- Lukashenko as a friend and supporter of rogue regimes
• Belorusy I Rynok 028 “Belarus’ reputation of a friend of rogue regimes could lead to
economic sanctions from the United States”
•

Belorusy I Rynok 068 “We’ve buried capitalism – that was Lukashenko’s catch phrase
during his official visit to Venezuela”

- Lukashenko is ignoring major problems
• Belorusy I Rynok 089 “It looks like Lukashenko is to going to implement economic
changes that are required by the IMF in order to get another credit”
- Rhetoric, not supported by actions
• Belorusy I Rynok 007. In his speech, Lukashenko was trying to switch focus from
numerous economic problems to exaggerated and questionable victories”
- Problems with foreign relations (without explaining whose fault is it)
• Belorusy I Rynok 039 “Belarusian and Russian delegation could not reach the
agreement again”
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•

Belorusy I Rynok 041 “Current gas and oil confrontation with Russian brought to a
question Russia-Belarus military alliance”

- Progress and success in foreign relations as a result of great leadership of Lukashenko (staterun newspapers)
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 141: “Until the end of this year Belarus will get 4 million tons
of Venezuela oil. This agreement was reached by President Lukashenko during his visit
to Karakas.”
- Everybody reports to Lukashenko
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 119: President Lukashenko had a meeting with State Secretary
of Defense, who reported to the president.
- Lukashenko gives instruction and assignments
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 044: “President demanded to work out transit agreements in the
best interests of Belarus.”
- Lukashenko is not satisfied with performed work, critiques his subordinates
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 101: “President Lukashenko expressed his displeasure with the
work of Belarusian linen producers.”
•

Sovetskaya Bielorussia 016: “President criticized the work of the government.”

- Lukashenko as a patron and benefactor (state-run newspapers)
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 145: “Today Shklov area looks like a huge construction site…
thanks to President Lukashenko.”
- Lukashenko is making right decisions
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 097: “President signed a new decree… “This will be terrific for
the Grodno region”, said Alexader Yakobson from Grodno.”
- Routine work of the president (independent and state-run newspapers)
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 008: “Lukashenko visited Switzerland”
Themes: Opposition political parties
- Repressions against opposition political parties (independent newspapers)
• Narodnaya Volya 402: “Anatoly Lebednko will be taken into court for his support for
the Polish Union.”
•

Narodnaya Volya 437: “As soon as activists of the Young Front took out posters, the
special police forces attacked demonstrators and started to arrest people. Using brutal
force police dragged people into busses and beaten them up.”

- Parties as alternative diplomats (independent newspapers)
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•

Narodnaya Volya 409: “Delegation of the Belarusian opposition visit Warsaw. They
will meet with representatives of Polish government, European Union and other and
international organizations and discuss situation in Belarus.”

- Parties critique of the Belarusian authorities (independent newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok 121: “As the leader of United Civil Party stated, the party is not
satisfied with the changes in election regulations, because political parties did not get a
guaranteed opportunity to take part in control over counting the votes.”
•

Belorusy I Rynok 129: “The leader of BNF stated that the Belarusian authorities have
total control over electoral process.”

- Parties as human rights advocates (independent newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok 117: “United Civil Party reacted to the outcome of the court
hearings… The party will take efforts to push international organization to recognize A.
Bondarenko as a prisoner of conscience.”
- Scattered nature of political opposition / conflicts between parties (independent and state-run
newspapers)
• Belorusy I Rynok 118 “On October 27th declaration on the new “Belarusian Independent
block” was signed. The new block devaluate the importance of the United Democratic
Forces as an organization representing most of the opposition. The notion of “united
opposition” is now destroyed, and the chances to agree on the single candidate are
going down.
- Activities within parties (independent newspapers)
• Narodnaya Volya 603 “Last weakened Anatoly Lebendko was re-elected as a a head of
the United Civil Party.”
- Passiveness and inactivity of political parties (state-run newspapers)
• Sovetskaya Bielorussia 256. “Political parties are being passive again – only 3% of all
applications came from them. The same picture with the formation of local committees.
Less than 1% of applications came from political parties.”
•

Zvyazda 275 “There are almost no candidates from political parties in the local
elections. Parties are sleeping… And all the new changes in the laws that make it easier
for parties to participate in elections – parties are not using any of those opportunities.”
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APPENDIX C
RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS
a. Newspaper
1. Sovetskaya Bielorussia
2. Zvyazda
3. Narodnaya Volya
4. Belorusy I Rynok
b. Article number
c. Type of publication:
1. News article
2. Opinion piece (editorial, expert interview etc.)
3. Press release (if apparent)
4. Official document (presidential decrees and directives, other legislative acts)
5. Other
d. Main topic
1. Domestic politics
2. International politics
3. Domestic economy
4. International economy
5. Sports
6. Culture and science
7. Everyday life
8. Other
e. Main subject in the article
1. President
2. Military
3. Independent unions
4. Opposition parties
5. Other
f. Secondary subject in the article
1. President
2. Military
3. Independent Unions
4. Opposition Parties
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g. Institution in general or personified
1. Institution
2. Person
h. Apparent evaluation of the main subject
1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
i. Apparent evaluation of the secondary subject
1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
j. Nature of actions of the institution
1. Attempt/intent to do good
2. Have/ will have positive outcome
3. Have/ will have negative outcome
4. Actions are not being taken, though necessary (apathetic).
5. Neutral/none (not an action oriented article or no indications of the action
outcomes are present in the article, actions of other subjects are being discussed)
k. Main frame of the article (see the list of frames)
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Table C1. Military in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Attempt/ Intent to do Good

15

16.9%

Have/ will have Positive Outcome

51

57.3%

Neutral/no outcome could be inferred

23

25.8%

Table C2. Military in Independent Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Attempt/ Intent to do Good

1

2.5%

Have/ will have Positive Outcome

2

5.0%

Have/ will have Negative Outcome

17

42.5%

Actions are not being taken, though
necessary

2

5.0%

Neutral/no outcome could be inferred

18

45.0%

Table C3. Opposition Parties in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Have/ will have Negative Outcome

3

15.0%

Actions are not being taken, though
necessary

15

75.0%

Neutral/no outcome could be inferred

2

10.0%

Table C4. President in State-run Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Attempt/ Intent to do Good

76

20.1%

Have/ Will have Positive Outcome

138

36.5%

Neutral/ no outcome could be infered

164

43.4%
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Table C5. Opposition Parties in Independent Newspapers. Nature of Actions
Actions

Frequency

Percent

Attempt/ Intent to do Good

115

45.5%

Have/ Will have Positive Outcome

33

13.0%

Have/ will have Negative Outcome

2

0.8%

Actions are not being taken, though
necessary

10

4.0%

Neutral/none

93

36.8%

Table C6. President in Independent Newspapers. Publication Type
Publication Type

Frequency

Percent

News Article

369

90.9%

Opinion Piece

37

9.1%

Table C7. President in State-run Newspapers. Publication type.
Publication Type

Frequency

Percent

News Article

189

50.0%

Opinion Piece

33

8.7%

Press Release

144

38.1%

Official Document

11

2.9%

Other

1

0.3%
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APPENDIX D
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
Table D1. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in Independent Unions
Trust to State-run Media /
Confidence in Independent
Unions

Trust
State-run
Media

Do not
trust Staterun Media

N/A

Total

Confident in
Independent Unions

Count

338

152

14

504

Percent

42.3%

26.1%

10.8%

33.3%

Not confident in
Independent Unions

Count

283

317

22

622

Percent

35.4%

54.5%

16.9%

41.1%

Not sure about
Independent Unions

Count

178

112

94

384

Percent

22.3%

19.2%

72.3%

25.4%

Count

1

1

0

2

Percent

0.1%

0.2%

0.0%

0.1%

Count

800

582

130

1512

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

N/A

Total

Table D2. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in Opposition Parties
Trust to State-run Media /
Confidence in Opposition
Parties

Trust
State-run
Media

Do not
trust Staterun Media

N/A

Total

Confident in
Opposition Parties

Count

120

123

3

246

Percent

15.0%

21.1%

2.3%

16.3%

Not confident in
Opposition Parties

Count

575

335

38

948

Percent

72.0%

57.6%

29.2%

62.7%

Not sure about
Opposition Parties

Count

102

123

89

314

Percent

12.8%

21.1%

68.5%

20.8%

Count

2

1

0

3

Percent

0.3%

0.2%

0.0%

0.2%

Count

799

582

130

1511

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

N/A

Total
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Table D3. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in Military
Trust
State-run
Media

Do not trust
State-run
Media

N/A

Total

Count

608

155

46

809

Percent

76.0%

26.7%

35.4%

53.6%

Not confident in
Military

Count

124

355

11

490

Percent

15.5%

61.2%

8.5%

32.5%

Not sure about
Military

Count

68

70

73

211

Percent

8.5%

12.1%

56.2%

14.0%

Count

800

580

130

1510

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Trust to State-run Media /
Confidence in Military
Confident in Military

Total

Table D4. Crosstab: Trust in State-run Media and Confidence in President
Trust to State-run Media /
Confidence in President

Trust
State-run
Media

Do not
trust Staterun Media

N/A

Total

Confident in
President

Count

714

81

38

833

Percent

89.3%

13.9%

29.0%

55.1%

Not confident in
President

Count

57

449

9

515

Percent

7.1%

77.1%

6.9%

34.0%

Not sure about
President

Count

29

52

84

165

Percent

3.6%

8.9%

64.1%

10.9%

Count

800

582

131

1513

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
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Table D5. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in Independent Unions
Trust to Independent Media /
Confidence in Independent
Unions
Confident in
Independent
Unions
Not confident in
Independent
Unions
Not sure about
Independent
Unions
N/A

Total

Trust
Do not trust
Independent Independent
Media
Media

N/A

Total

Count

331

159

14

504

Percent

47.3%

25.6%

7.4%

33.4%

Count

228

367

26

621

Percent

32.6%

59.1%

13.7%

41.1%

Count

140

95

149

384

Percent

20.0%

15.3%

78.4%

25.4%

Count

1

0

1

2

Percent

0.1%

0.0%

0.5%

0.1%

Count

700

621

190

1511

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Table D6. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in Opposition Parties
Trust to Independent Media /
Confidence in Opposition
Parties

Trust
Do not trust
Independent Independent
Media
Media

N/A

Total

Confident in
Opposition Parties

Count

160

83

3

246

Percent

22.9%

13.3%

1.6%

16.3%

Not confident in
Opposition Parties

Count

416

486

46

948

Percent

59.4%

78.1%

24.2%

62.7%

Not sure about
Opposition Parties

Count

123

51

141

315

Percent

17.6%

8.2%

74.2%

20.8%

Count

1

2

0

3

Percent

0.1%

0.3%

0.0%

0.2%

Count

700

622

190

1512

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

N/A

Total
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Table D7. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in Military
Trust to Independent Media /
Confidence in Military

Trust
Do not trust
Independent Independent
Media
Media

N/A

Total

Confident in
Military

Count

352

389

68

809

Percent

50.4%

62.5%

35.8%

53.5%

Not confident in
Military

Count

258

202

30

490

Percent

36.9%

32.5%

15.8%

32.4%

Not sure about
Military

Count

89

31

92

212

Percent

12.7%

5.0%

48.4%

14.0%

Count

699

622

190

1511

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Total

Table D8. Crosstab: Trust in Independent Media and Confidence in President
Trust to Independent Media /
Confidence in President

Trust
Do not trust
Independent Independent
Media
Media

N/A

Total

Confident in
President

Count

342

409

81

832

Percent

48.8%

65.9%

42.6%

55.0%

Not confident in
President

Count

296

194

25

515

Percent

42.2%

31.2%

13.2%

34.1%

Not sure about
President

Count

63

18

84

165

Percent

9.0%

2.9%

44.2%

10.9%

Count

701

621

190

1512

Percent

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Total
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